Last week we marked the end of the Iraq War, a long and arduous conflict that cost almost 4,500 American lives, over 32,200 wounded and cost approximately $1 Trillion. The war also deposed a brutal dictator and planted the seeds for a democratic Iraq – if, to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, the country can keep it.
Historians will debate the outcome of the Iraq War and whether or not the U.S. achieved its strategic goals, but what is clear is that the Iraq War changed the way our country conducts intelligence and operations in wartime.
Many allege that the Iraq War started because of an “intelligence failure.” Not only U.S., but also foreign intelligence agencies reported that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Hussein had used chemical weapons on the Kurdish and Shi’ite populations in Iraq. He had also used these weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.
In the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Hussein certainly acted as if he had these weapons. It turned out, though, that he was bluffing. Allegedly, he had destroyed his chemical and biological weapons stockpiles sometime after the first Gulf War. The reason for his bluff: he wanted to keep Iran from attacking Iraq, a threat that he correctly perceived as being an existential one to his regime.
What he failed to understand, though, was that in post-9/11 America we did not have the patience for his games and we weren’t going to wait around for the diplomatic dance of the U.N., the weapons inspectors, and others to be finished to find out whether or not he still had these terrible weapons at his disposal. Rightly or wrongly, policy choices were made based on what we thought we knew at the time.
The one thing that did become clear in retrospect was that the intelligence discipline is not an exact science. While precise scientific input is essential for us to understand most intelligence data, placing that information in the proper context is more of an art. It requires the meshing of scientific with cultural and political information and a dispassionate ability to analyze and understand the information presented. And sometimes we get that analysis wrong and we fail to understand.
Tactically, though, the U.S. military benefited from significant breakthroughs in our ability to collect, disseminate and analyze information for the commanders on the ground. For years the U.S. military had suffered from Cold War-style intelligence compartmentalization. There were many cases in which relevant or “actionable” intelligence never made it the operational commanders who could use it. That began to change from the first day of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
On March 19, 2003 we launched the “Shock and Awe” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. That phase was an air campaign that decimated Iraqi air defenses and gave the U.S. air supremacy over Iraq. The ensuing aerial bombardment combined with rapid movements by Army and Marine ground forces made the Blitzkrieg of World War II look like amateur hour in comparison.
The intelligence effort underlying this military campaign was massive. For the air component, the intelligence was fused rapidly from multiple sources. Technical and human intelligence were brought together in unique ways. For the first time, national and tactical intelligence data was effectively integrated. Different intelligence agencies worked together to bring their specific area of expertise to bear and their information helped inform the Air Campaign Plan and the Targeting Cycle.
The other key factor was the nearly universal use of chat rooms. Used sporadically in previous operations, they became ubiquitous in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. These chat rooms allowed for real-time coordination of all aspects of the air campaign and served to link forward-based elements with the various theater headquarters as well as with intelligence agencies in this area. In this way operational planners had access to the most up-to-date intelligence and intelligence personnel were made aware of operational plans as well as on-going missions.
Of course, once the air campaign was over, the land forces then had the difficult task of actually taking control of Iraq. For them the intelligence challenge was immense. But here as well national agencies and the Army created an immense data mining capability, using input from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, satellites, ground-based sensors, and old-fashioned personal observation to build an amazingly complete picture of the battle space. These efforts made the famous Iraq “surge” an operational success, shortened the war and saved countless lives.
The lessons learned from the Iraq War will be studied for many years. Within the Intelligence Community, these lessons will create the model for how intelligence should be fused with combat operations. We will always have to work hard to understand the mindset of a potential adversary, whether on the strategic or the tactical level. Our intelligence professionals can never be certain that they will achieve such complete understanding of an enemy. But, what was done during the Iraq War in this area is now a model for future operations because it had never been done before on such a massive scale. It is also a legacy that intelligence professionals at Quantico, Fort Belvoir and other locations in our area can be very proud to have played a major role in.
Cedric Leighton lives in Lorton and is the Founder and President of Cedric Leighton Associates, a Washington area strategic risk and management consultancy.
